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(;"'f,...,L ,  THE  U.S.A.,  THE  E.C.  AND  JAPAN-
IS  IT  TO  DE  CO-OPERATION  OR  CONFLICT  ? 
In  the trade  field proper  the  Community  has  always 
urged  the maintenance  of  an  open  world trading  economy  as  a 
fundamental  precondition for  economic recovery.  This 
position was  recently reaffirmed by  Mr  Wilhelm Haferkamp, 
the  European  Commission Vice-President responsible  for 
external  trade.  Any drift towards  protectionism would 
clearly raise serious dangers  for  the Community  as  the 
largest world  importer of energy  and  raw materials.  The 
:Community  can  only  balance its trade  books  and  safeguard 
jobs  by  exporting manufactured  goods.  The  Community  is  in 
fact  also the world's  largest exporting power.  Its sales 
outside the  Community  accounted in  1981  for  18.2%  of world 
exports.  The  United States share  was  13.5%  and  Japan  9.1%. 
Exports  and  imports  combined  represented  26.5%  of the  gross 
domestic product  of the Community,  compared  to  17.7%  in 
the  United States  and  26.1%  in Japan.  And  yet Japanese 
imports  of manufactured  goods  totalled only  2.5%  of gross 
domestic product,  against  5.7%  in  the  Community  and 
5
% 
in the  United States. 
The  Community's  trade with  the  United  States  and 
Japan  has  one  thing  in  common.  In  both cases,  the Community 
runs  a  large trade deficit,  although  for  very different 
r~asons.  The  combined  deficit of the conrnunity in trade 
w~th these  two  countries  accounted  in  1981  f 
total deficit.  or  62%  of  i~s 
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Nevertheless,  the  Community  import tariff is one 
of  the most  liberal in the world.  It was 
established by 
taking  an  average  of the national tar;ffs 
.....  previously in 
force,  thereby reducing  the  highest rates. 
As  a  result 
~f GATT  negotiations,  the  average  Community  import tariff 
J.s  to be  reduced  from  around  9%  to  7.5%  between  1982  and 
19B8.  At  the  same  time,  the  Community  and  other  GATT 
countries have  agreed to take  a  series of measures to 
resist the. protectionist trend provoked  by the  deepening 
recession. 
This  is not  a  simple  task.  More  than  ever,  free  trade 
cannot  be  allowed to become  a  one  way  street.  At  Bruges 
on  4  October  1982,  }tr  Gaston  Thorn,  President of the 
__ European  Commission  said:  "In  times  as  troubled  as  these, 
governments  are increasingly inclined to draw  back into 
their shells.  Let's be  honest.  ~o-one can  completely 
resist this temptation,  not  even  we  in Europe.  The  Commission 
is constantly confronted  by protectionist tendencies.  At 
a  time  when  the  unemployed  in the  Community  run  into millions, 
no  government  can afford to be  guided  by  theoretical 
models  of perfect competition and insist on  free trade at 
any  price.  l'7hat  is needed is an  agreement with all our 
trading partners  on  an  acceptable balance between  the 
advantages  of  untramme11~a competition  and  the·political and 
social constraints which make  protective measures  necessary." 
The  recession has hit hard in the  United States as 
well  as  in Europe.  It is hardly surprising therefore that 
complaints  are made  more  vigorously than  ever before,  about 
certain aspects  of policy on  both sides  of the Atlantic. 
'ty believes it is vital to defuse  these disputes  The  Coi!IlnunJ. 
a  basis freely  agreed by  equal  and  through  a  dialogue  on 
sympathetic partners. 3
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Criticism of the  common  agricultural policy is  a 
constant  theme  of the  US  attitude to the  Community. 
The  United States  accuses  Community  subsidies  of  . 
creating unfair competition  for  American  food  exports. 
The  Community's  unfailing reply is that European  food 
exports  are sold at the world  price  and that the  cost 
per head  of  subsidising farmers  is less in  the  Community 
'than  in the  United States.  In  1979  the  comparative 
outlay was  1.05  ECU  in Europe  for every  1.28  ECU  in  the 
United States.  Furthermore,  GATT  rules  do  not  outlaw 
subsidies;  they only  forbid their use  as  a  way  of 
capturing  an  unfair  share of the market.  It is important 
to recall that the  Community  is the  largest importer  of 
agricultural goods  in  the world.  Its agricultural trade 
deficit with  the  United States  - which  sells four  times 
-.  -..more  foodstuffs  to Europe  than it buys  - totalled 5,000 
million  ECU  in  1980.  From  1970 to  1980 the  Community 
share of world  agricultural trade'fell from  16.6%  to  14.9% 
The  US  share  increased from  38.9%  to  44.8%.  It is 
difficult,  in the light of these  facts,  to justify 
accusations of an  aggressive  Community  policy in 
agricultural trade.  The  US  Government  has  lodged  complaints 
under  the  GATT  in many  sectors  - sugar,  fruit conserves, 
grapes,  poultry,  pasta  and  flour  - but  no  evidence  can  be 
produced to show that American difficulties are  caused 
by  subsidized Community  sales.  The  Community  showed that 
it was  ready  to enter into a  dialogue  on  these  issues 
when  it recently agreed to take part in  a  two  year 
programme  of  study  and  discussions  in the  GATT  framework. 
But there  can be  no question of  abandoning either the main 
principles of the  common  agricultural policy or the 
preferential agreements with Mediterranean countries, 
whose  political importance has  been recognised  by  the 
United States.  Nor  can  the  Community  accept  savage  acts 
of retaliation by  the United States,  such  as  the recent 
agreement  to sell wheat  flour  to Egypt  at prices far  below 
those  on  the  world market.  A  complaint  has  been  lodged 
under  the  GATT  about  this deal. Community  exports  of steel to the  United States 
have  also  been  called into question.  The  ten  community 
governments  agreed  to joint negotiations with  the  . 
United States  in  this sector,  one  of the  few not directly 
covered  by  the  common  overseas  trade policy.  The 
Community  managed  to substitute  the threat of  a  severe 
import  duty  for  a  voluntary export restraint agreement, 
·which  was  not  so damaging to European  exporters, 
although  nevertheless  a  substantial sacrifice.  The 
Community  argued that public subsidies to European  steel 
firms  were strictly controlled and  intended to restructure 
the  industry,  not to subsidise exports.  The  Community 
pointed out that its steel exports  had  remained at 
broadly the  same  level for  a  long period.  The  battle is 
not over yet.  American  companies  have  started an 
_offensive against European  exports  of special steels, 
not  covered by  the original  agreement. 
These  are  the main  problems  vis-a-vis the  United States 
but  perhaps  the Japanese  ones  are more  intractable.  The 
Community  deficit in  trade with Japan is actually slightly 
below that with the  United States.  But it is  a  matter for 
greater concern because  the  gap  arises  from  one quarter 
of the overall volume  of the  US-European  trade.  Japanese 
penetration of  European markets is constantly increasing. 
Community exports  to Japan represent only one  third of 
Japanese  sales to the  Community.  It is especially 
worrying that the deficit is steadily rising,  from 
500 million ECU  in 1970 to 10,600 million  ECU  in 1981. 
This  structural imbalance  in trade with  Japan afflicts 
almost all industrialised countries.  A  major  importer of 
energy  and  raw materials,  Japan  imports  the  same  quantity 
of manufactured  goods  as  Switzerland,  whose  GNP  is ten 
times  smaller. 
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One  reason  for  this deficit is the  innumerable 
obstacles  faced  by  European  firms  wishing to export to 
Japan.  Japanese  customs  duties are,  on  average,  no 
higher  than  those  in  the  Community.  But  problems  are  . 
~aused by  their wide  divergence  on  either side  of this 
theoretical average.  The  duties  are very  small  in 
sectors  -v1here  there is no  threat  from  international 
competition but  much  higher where  the threat exists  . 
..  In  addition,  quota  arrangements  and  niggling standards 
regulations make  importation virtually impossible in many 
cases.  Perhaps still more  important  are  a  series of 
hidden obstacles,  created by  the  close-knit relationships 
between  Japanese  industry,  bankers,  distributors  and 
even  certain  arms  of  government.  European  industry 
has,  in many  cases,  been  slow to grasp the  importance  of 
the Japanese market  but  they  have  hardly been  encouraged 
by  the many  barriers which protect Japan  from  foreign 
competition. 
Japanese barriers like this are  indefensible.  The 
concentration of Japanese  exports has  been  on  the most 
sensitive sectors of the European market;  cars, motor-
cycles,  televisions,  video recorders  and  certain machine 
tools.  Despite the restrictions  ~posed in  some  countries 
Japanese exports in these  sectors have  increased to the 
point "Vrhere  they constitute  a  real threat to European 
jobs.  Japanese video recorders  have,  for  instance, 
captured more  than  80%  of the European market.  To  combat 
these problems,  the Community  has taken action  ranging 
from statistical  monitoring of Japanese  imports to 
complaints under  international agreements.  It has tabled 
a  global  complaint under  the  GATT,  protesting against 
the  economic  structure which  reduces  the likelihood of 
Japan  importing manufactured  goods.  The  Community 
claims  this distorts the rights  and obligations  which  flow 
from  the various  GATT  negotiations.  This  Community 
complaint is of obvious  interest to Japan's  other trading 
partners,  who  experience the  same  difficulties in penetrating 
the Japanese market. 6
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The  CoMmunity  nas  also  taken  positive measures. 
Since  1979 it has  financed  a  programme  which  aims  to 
promote  European  exports  (seminars,  market  studies, 
training of European  executives  in Japan).  At  the  same 
time,  it has  asked  Japan to increase its volume  of 
manufactured  imports  to a  level comparable  with  those of 
other industrialised countries.  To  this  end,  the 
Community  has  suggested  a  number  of concrete  changes, 
involving  customs  duties,  taxes  and  quotas  on  a  whole 
series of agricultural products,  foodstuffs  and  industrial 
goods.  Other  changes  have  been  proposed  for the  standards, 
testing  and  agreement  procedures  affecting pharmaceuticals, 
agro-chemicals,  cosmetics,  food  additives,  electrical 
and  household  goods  and  motor  vehicles.  The  Community 
_has  also called for  an  opening  up  of the banking, 
distribution and  insurance sectors as well  as  a  "gesture" 
by  Japan  in  the  purchase of European  aeronautical  equipment. 
In  1982  the Japanese  government  announced  a  series 
of trade liberalization measures  which,  although  a  step in 
the  right direction,  covered  only  10%  of Community  exports. 
These  measures,  mainly involving changes  in  import duties, 
were  followed  up  early in  1983  by  promises of reductions 
in  a  whole  series of non-tariff barriers.  At  the  same  time, 
the  Community  has  recently persuaded the Japanese authorities 
to moderate their exports of sensitive products  like 
video recorders,  cars,  machine  tools. 
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